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Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of 
political rights. This feature is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature.  We expand 
on this view of democracy by reincorporating the role of civil liberties, which are at the core 
of modern democracy, in two ways.  First, we present a conceptual framework that identifies 
four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil 
liberties.  Perhaps more importantly, we provide systematic, robust and varied empirical 
evidence on this differential evolution using cross-national panel data.  Our two main results 
are: Civil liberties are far more persistent than political rights in affecting subsequent 
outcomes; Civil liberties are complementary to political rights in affecting subsequent 
outcomes, but the reverse is not the case.  These two main results are robust to alternative 
measures of democracy as political rights, the addition of covariates, estimation techniques, 
and variations in our sample.  In particular these results are invariant to whether or not the 
modernization hypothesis holds or the political natural resource curse exists. More generally, 
our analysis can be framed as an implementation and comparison of two different approaches 
to democracy: the electoral democracy view and the liberal democracy view. The data 
support the latter. 
 






A substantial fraction of economic and political science studies view democracy in terms of the 
existence of political rights and, in particular, free and fair elections.  This view has a long tradition 
which can be traced back to Schumpeter (1942).  Recently, it is adopted, for example, by Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2006).  Their third chapter, titled ‘What do we know about democracy?’ reproduces 
Schumpeter’s view that democracy is “… the institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people’s vote (p. 48).”  In his influential work, Samuel Huntington —a prominent political 
scientist—also subscribes to this view (1991, p.6).  
In the policy arena, however, this focus has led to glaring inconsistencies between supposedly 
democratic regimes of various vintages and their undemocratic behavior in other aspects. Egypt is a 
recent dramatic example. While the Egyptian elections in May of 2012 were generally seen as free 
and fair, sophisticated commentators readily admitted in justifying the recent coup that the 
country’s governance since then has been highly undemocratic (Ignatius, 2013).  One of them notes 
“[Egyptian President] Morsi governed as a thug…” (Milbank, 2013). This example illustrates a 
basic problem that is pervasive in affecting many recent democracies in all regions of the world.  
For instance, in the Middle East and North Africa, Arab Spring countries and even Turkey are 
affected. Among transition countries, Hungary and Russia provide illustrations of the problem; 
among Latin American countries Argentina and Venezuela illustrate different variants of the same 
basic problem.  Namely, societies can manage to have free and fair elections symbolizing the 
provision of political rights; yet, they can be underperforming substantially in the provision of civil 
liberties.  Since the latter are an equally fundamental aspect of democratic governance, we may 
need a more nuanced view of democracy for policy purposes.  
An early and important empirical contribution to the determinants of democratization in the 
economics literature, Barro (1999), may have played a role in the de-emphasis of civil liberties as a 
dimension of democracy.  Barro considers civil liberties as an alternative to political rights, which 




across countries and concludes a brief section on civil liberties as follows (p.177) “…the economic 
and social forces that promote electoral rights are similar to those that stimulate civil liberties.”  Our 
results suggest that this is not the case in two ways: in how they affect each other, which he did not 
consider, and in how other variables affect them, given the newer and longer time series available 
now.  In addition, high simple correlations between variables across countries can be very different 
from the partial correlations across countries keeping other variables constant.  The results in 
section IV, for example, provide an illustration of the differences. 
Some political scientists have addressed this issue in general terms.  For instance, views of 
democracy tied solely to the holding of free elections are referred to as minimalist and they are 
contrasted to an alternative insisting on “…a more ample degree of protection of political and civil 
liberties,” Plattner (2002, pp.56-57).  Other political scientists have referred to Schumpeter’s view 
and similar ones in political science such as Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibug and Limogi (2000) as 
subminimal (Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán 2007, Ch.5).  They propose additional properties 
to eliminate ‘defective’ or ‘illiberal’ democracies from classification as democracies.  Moreover, 
even political scientists who fall into the category of minimalists or subminimalists have not done 
so out of ignorance of the importance of civil liberties, and have provided reasons for their choice. 
It is instructive to consider one rationale provided by Przeworski et.al. (2000, Ch.1), since they 
provide a point of departure for most recent empirical literature in political science.  They write 
“…whether or not regimes characterized by freedom of opinion, widespread participation and 
repeated elections are in fact responsive is best left open for investigation rather than resolved by 
definition.”(pp.33-34). Even Dahl’s (1971) procedural definition is rejected by this view. They go 
on to justify one of their excluded choices as follows “We want to be able to examine empirically, 
rather than decide by definition, whether or not the repeated holding of contested elections is 
associated with economic performance.” (p.35).  In our case, we also want to decide empirically 
whether or not  civil liberties have a role in determining political rights.  More recently, Coppedge 
et al (2011) survey the large literature on democracy and identify six different conceptions or 
‘models’: electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian.   
For our purposes, a useful way of characterizing an alternative to the electoral conception is through 




degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and 
mutually binding consultations” (Tilly 2007, p. 13).  Moreover, he further states that, “…roughly 
speaking, political rights correspond to broad, equal, mutually binding consultations, whereas civil 
liberties refer especially to protection” (p.45).  This conceptualization of liberal democracy has 
three useful properties: it raises the issue of whether these two dimensions of democracy evolve in 
complementary, substitutable or independent patterns; it can be implemented empirically in a 
manner consistent with perhaps the most prominent prior work on the topic, at least in economics; 
and it allows differentiation between truly democratic regimes and electoral but illiberal 
democracies that fail to protect civil liberties. 
Viewing political rights and civil liberties as two different dimensions of democracy naturally 
suggests the question – Do they behave as complementary, substitute or independent dimensions in 
the evolution of democracy?  In the case of factors of production, complementarity refers to the 
case where a rise in price of an input, which decreases quantity of use, also leads to a decrease in 
the quantity of another input with output constant (substitutability and independence refer to cases 
where the price rise leads to an increase or no change, respectively).1  In the case of democracy, if 
changes in one dimension of democracy induce changes in the same direction for a second 
dimension over a given timeframe, one can view them as evolutionary complements; if such 
changes induce opposite ones in the second dimension, one can view them as evolutionary 
substitutes; and if there is no effect of one dimension on the second, one can view them as 
evolutionarily independent.  Thus, in principle, the existence of two separate dimensions generates a 
variety of possible patterns in the evolution of democracies.   
Relying on the liberal democracy approach provides an encompassing framework in which to 
consider the evolution of democracy empirically.  It allows for the possibility of asymmetries in 
each dimension such that the two dimensions affect each other differently.  These asymmetries 
include extreme cases in which one dimension affects the other but not vice versa.  The latter 
situation, for example, can be viewed as very suggestive of a necessary condition for one dimension 
having a causal effect on the other one.  The former can’t be interpreted in that manner. For, it is 
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always possible and perhaps even likely with aggregate data, i.e., with all the possible factors 
changing in the evolutionary setting, that a third factor is affecting both and there is no causality in 
the association.   
Notwithstanding the general caveat, the possibility of a third factor generating a positive relation in 
one dimension and no relation in the other dimension is much less likely in the extreme situation 
even with aggregate data.  A two-dimensional view of democracy also allows one to include or 
exclude various explanatory factors that have been or can be identified or suggested as a relevant 
determinant of either dimension of democracy in any empirical setting.  Finally, it includes as a 
special case the independent dimensions or electoral conception of democracy where, following 
Schumpeter, only political rights are  viewed as relevant for practical purposes.   
Schumpeter’s view underlies almost all empirical attempts to identify the determinants of 
democracy to date (we discuss several strands of this literature below).  At the same time, the liberal 
democracy view has not been implemented empirically with standard, modern tools.   Tilly’s work 
suggests how to measure both political rights and civil liberties in his discussion of post-socialist 
democratization (2007, p. 45-49), i.e., Freedom House’s separate measures of political rights and 
civil liberties (e.g., Piano and Puddington, 2006). Furthermore, the same measure of political rights 
Tilly relies on in his 2007 work is used in almost all empirical studies of democracy that depart 
from Schumpeter’s view.  The FH measure is used either as a primary measure of political rights or 
as a robustness check on any other measure used as the principal measure.  Exclusive focus on 
political rights is especially true of the recent strand of empirical literature that seeks to explain the 
role of income in determining democracy.  
A prominent example in economics is the seminal work by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and 
Yared (2008) [henceforth AJRY].  It has led to a large, increasingly specialized and rapidly growing 
literature addressing issues raised by their main finding. The finding by AJRY that the level of per 
capita income has no impact on democracy in the long run once fixed effects and endogeneity are 
accounted for has attracted considerable attention.  It rejects an important—if not the most 
important—component of Lipset’s (1959) long standing modernization hypothesis, which has been 
also supported more recently by Huntington (1991) and others.  In the economics literature, this 




more advanced econometric methods and expanded data sets to reverse the conclusion, e.g., 
Benhabib, Corvalan and Spiegel (2011) and Che et al. (2012). It also led to a subsequent 
contribution in the same vein by AJRY (2009).         
One equally prominent example in political science focusing exclusively on political rights is the 
contribution by Przeworski et al (2000, Ch.2).  It has also led to a growing subsequent literature. 
One strand relevant in our context has emphasized the impact of development in terms of per capita 
income on two different aspects of democracy: its stability, which is one of Przeworski et al (2000) 
two main findings, and its lack of effect in bringing democracy into existence or democratization, 
which is the other one.  Boix and Stokes (2003) challenged this second finding.  More recently Boix 
(2011) proposed and found empirical evidence in support of what he calls ‘conditional 
modernization’ theory. Namely, his panel data work supports the stability effect, the positive effect 
of income on democracy over the long-run (meaning going back into the beginning of the 19th 
century) and its lack of effect or amelioration of this effect in the short-run (meaning after World 
War II).   
From our point of view, it does not matter what position one prefers or supports in this debate on 
whether or not income plays a role in determining democracy defined in terms of political rights. 
We ask and answer a different question: Namely, does it make any difference to the role of income, 
if any, in explaining the evolution of democracy, thus defined, whether or not political rights and 
civil liberties evolve in complementary, independent or substitute fashion in this process?  One of 
our contributions in this paper is to answer this question relying on the insights generated by the 
above contributions.   
Mention should also be made of a somewhat related strand of literature in economics that assesses 
the impact of short-run aggregate shocks to the rate of economic growth on democracy measured in 
terms of political rights.  For instance these shocks are weather and export revenues, Burke and 
Leigh (2010), within country variations in rainfall in sub-Saharan Africa, Bruckner and Ciccone 
(2011), and oil price shocks, Bruckner Ciccone and Tesei (2012). Restrictions on the number of 
countries, methodologies and focus on specific shocks limit their applicability and usefulness in the 




that similar questions arise in their context. For example, does the role of civil liberties as a 
potential complementary factor in the evolution of political rights modifies their results?    
Barro’s contribution, mentioned earlier, also provides an initial link to other variables that may 
influence democracy in an empirical setting.  He relies on the economics and political science 
literature up to that point as a mechanism to identify potential determinants of democracy to include 
in his empirical analysis.  For instance, use of Lipset’s work suggests to him inclusion of GDP per 
capita, education and urbanization. He also relies on population as a measure of country size, which 
he views as endogenous following Alesina and Spolaore (1997). He also includes a dummy variable 
for oil exporting countries in his basic regression.  We expand on this issue below since it has been 
the source of considerable recent literature in both economics and political science.  Finally, of the 
additional potential variables he considered the proportion of Muslims stands out statistically.  We 
revisit this aspect of Barro’s original approach with current tools and insights.  
In both economics and political science recent attention has been placed on what may be called the 
political natural resource curse by analogy with the economic natural resource curse initially 
associated with Dutch Disease, e.g., see Torvik (2009) for an excellent survey of the latter curse.  
With respect to the former curse, political scientists have emphasized its positive impact on the 
stability of democracy and dictatorship while economists have emphasized its negative impact on 
democratization.  Political scientists suggest a mechanism for a political resource curse to operate 
based on an idea highlighted by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006): Namely, elites promote 
democracy in terms of political rights as a means of preventing revolutions by the poor in the 
context of a class struggle over taxation.  In this setting additional oil wealth (or other sources of 
non-earned income) can be shown to have a negative impact on democratization by promoting 
stability in both non-democratic and democratic regimes.  Morrison (2007) specifies a simple 
theoretical model generating the result and also provides empirical evidence consistent with the 
result (2009). 
Economists have focused on democratization.  For instance, a recent analysis of the political 
resource curse by Tsui (2011) focuses on oil while relying on political rights as his measure of 
democracy.  He finds a negative effect of oil endowments, which can be justified as exogenous as 




essential logic of his argument is that the rents from a resource like oil can be effectively controlled 
by the state.  This feature enhances incentives for dictators to monopolize control of the state and 
more generally for political leaders to limit political competition in order to protect their access to 
the oil rents.  
From our point of view, however, it does not matter what position one takes on the existence of a 
political natural resource course or the impact of other determinants of democratization defined in 
terms of political rights. In both cases, we would raise the same question as before – Does it make 
any difference to the role of oil rents and other determinants of democracy whether or not political 
rights and civil liberties are complementary, independent or substitutes in explaining the evolution 
of democracy thus defined?  One of our contributions in this paper is to answer this question 
building on insights generated by the literature cited above.   
Up to this point we have stressed questions raised by the liberal democracy approach that impact 
and are impacted by the previous empirical literature.  Nonetheless, from our point of view two 
equally important questions are: 1) Are the impacts of income, the political resource course or other 
typical determinants of democracy relied upon in earlier literature on civil liberties the same as on 
political rights? 2) Does it make any difference to this broader view of democracy whether or not 
political rights are complementary, independent or substitutes in explaining the evolution of civil 
liberties?  An important contribution of this paper is to answer these questions in the same setting as 
the previous ones.   
Our work also relates to more recent studies assessing whether a broad set of institutions, 
particularly cultural norms, affect the pattern of democratization across countries.  For instance, in a 
recent working paper Gorodnichenko and Roland (2013) show that the degree to which a country’s 
culture reflects individualist (rather than collectivist) values affects the changes in its political rights  
over the past three decades.  Our paper offers evidence through which historically inherited cultural 
values may affect present day political outcomes, assuming these cultural values shape the degree 
of civil liberties in a polity.  Furthermore, our conceptual framework suggests mechanisms for their 
operation.  Indeed, an insightful recent paper by Czeglèdi (2013) relies on our differentiation 




The plan of the paper is as follows. We indicate carefully what we mean by political rights and civil 
liberties in the next section and discuss advantages and limitations of the corresponding empirical 
measures.  Here we also go beyond earlier work by identifying fundamental sources of differences 
in the potential evolution of these two dimensions of democracy at the conceptual level and two of 
their empirical implications.  Subsequently, in Section III, we discuss the data underlying our 
empirical analysis.   
Section IV focuses on analyzing the basic dynamics of unbundling democracy by observing the 
effects of civil liberties in explaining political rights, and vice versa, in the simplest possible setting.  
Using the most widely employed empirical techniques in both economics and political science--
least squares, we identify important characteristics of these two dimensions in the evolution of 
democracy that continue to hold throughout the rest of the paper.  In Section V we look at the 
impact on the results of applying GMM to address panel data bias in dynamic settings to the same 
data set and empirical specifications.  These two sections contain the most novel aspects of our 
empirical work.  They show that civil liberties are neither substitutes nor independent factors in the 
evolution of democracy but an essential complementary dimension that can determine the evolution 
of political rights without being similarly affected by them. 
Next, we focus on the ‘modernization’ hypothesis relying on our unbundled view of democracy by 
extending the analysis in AJRY and incorporating some of the recent contributions with respect to 
data set extensions and estimation methods in Section VI.  We provide three sets of robustness 
checks in Section VII.  First, we consider data features such as boundary issues in the FH measure, 
an alternative index of democracy in terms of political rights (the Polity IV index), and extensions 
of the sample time frame. Second, we consider the issue of balanced versus unbalance panels in the 
AJRY setting.  Third, we consider the impact of the political resource curse and other potential 
determinants of democracy highlighted in the literature in terms of potential omitted variable bias.  
In all these settings, our two main results on the role of civil liberties in the evolution of democracy 





II.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
Political rights are widely accepted as an essential dimension of democracy in recent political 
economy and political science literature.  Their definition commonly revolves around the provision 
of free and fair elections.  Most directly, they involve providing an electoral process with these 
characteristics at the executive, legislative and we would like to add local or regional level (the 
latter level is often ignored, although it matters, especially in large and/or populous countries).  One 
step removed is the provision of an environment free from intimidation and coercion for open and 
broad participation by citizens as voters, candidates and members of political parties.  Finally, these 
rights also include the provision of mechanisms that link the policies undertaken to their control by 
elected leaders in transparent ways that lead to accountability.  Freedom House’s political rights 
index is the empirical measure most directly linked to these features.2  Table A1A reproduces the 3 
categories and the 10 questions, scored on a scale of 0-4, used to construct this political rights 
index. 
In political science, there is a literature discussing the merits and demerits of various indexes.  The 
aggregate version of the Freedom House indexes has been criticized as maximalist because it 
includes too many attributes in a single indicator (for example, the FH civil liberties index includes 
the protection of property rights as an attribute).  This criticism does not apply to the political rights 
index defined above and employed in the economics literature, which does not include the 
offending attributes usually listed, e.g., Munck and Verkuilen (2002). Furthermore, it also does not 
apply to the civil liberties index, which does include some of these attributes, when viewed as a 
separate dimension of democracy.  Under our conceptualization it makes no sense to aggregate the 
two separate indexes.  One implication of our conceptualization is that Dahl’s (1971) procedural 
definition of democracy is inadequate by leaving out fundamental non-procedural elements, namely 
civil liberties as an essential but separate dimension. 
                                                      
2Alternative measures are also used empirically. Among them the most prominent one is the Polity IV index, which we 




While civil liberties are in principle widely recognized as an essential element of democracy in 
terms of protection of individual rights, they tend to be neglected in practice, as indicated in the 
introduction.  Hence, it is useful to discuss these in more detail.  Osiatyński (2009, p.2) makes a 
distinction between individual  rights, which he characterizes as emerging  in the 18th century, and 
human rights, which he views as a  20th century concept.  Individual rights have been recognized as 
essential characteristics of democracy over the last two hundred years, embedded as they are in 
many countries’ constitutions.  These individual rights are often referred to as first generation 
human rights. They usually include freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and a category that is 
much more difficult to describe.  It is sometimes referred to as due process protection, equal 
treatment under the law or protection from arbitrary treatment by the state. 
The concept of human rights, however, is somewhat broader and Osiatyński (2009, Ch.1) describes 
its evolution from the incorporation of an alternative tradition of collective rights or group rights in 
the 19th century through ideas of minority rights and finally leading  to notions of social and 
economic security in the post-WWII period.  This broader view of human rights is reflected in the 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  One interpretation of this broader view of human 
rights is that it incorporates notions of human dignity and includes rights which are not necessarily 
individual in nature.  As might be expected, this interpretation is not universally accepted, because 
it can be interpreted as implying that the state guarantees the entitlement of every individual to 
some minimum standard of living.  Such a guarantee has not been met by any state (if the standard 
is defined liberally).  
A narrower interpretation of additional human rights, however, has been adopted in the economics 
literature and referred to as “second generation human rights” by Kaufmann (2004) and others.  
These additional human rights—which are also of post-WWII vintage—include, for instance, 
secure ownership rights and individual mobility (in the pursuit of economic betterment) with 
respect to location, education and employment.  They have been viewed over the last several 
decades as part of the array of civil liberties to be provided and protected by a democratic 
government; for example, Freedom House includes them as part of its civil liberties index (see 
Piano and Puddington 2006).  We include these narrower second generation human rights in our 




measure of civil liberties in our empirical work.3  Table A1B of the Appendix reproduces the 4 
categories and the 15 questions, scored on a scale of 0-4, used to construct this civil liberties index. 
With these clarifications as a preamble, we note four fundamental differences between these two 
dimensions of democracy relevant for the evolution of democracies.  An important potential reason 
for the differential evolution of these two dimensions of democracy is the following: Citizens’ 
enjoyment of political rights such as the right to vote or volunteer to campaign for someone yields 
utility only indirectly—that is, through the policies enacted by those for whom a citizen voted or 
campaigned.  Whatever citizens expect to obtain from exercise of their political rights, there are two 
sources of uncertainty intervening between their actions and a desired outcome. First, their choice 
of politician or position needs to prevail in an election.  Second, the politician or the position needs 
to implement the citizens’ action as intended or promised.  One reflection of these additional 
uncertainties is the substantial literature in public choice and political science explaining why 
citizens bother to vote in the absence of a clearly defined self interested motivation to do so, e.g., 
Feddersen (2004).   
By contrast, citizens’ enjoyment of civil liberties such as freedom of speech, assembly and choice 
of location to live and work usually yields utility directly with far less uncertainty, if any, between 
the citizens’ action and the realization of the desired outcome.  It follows that these additional 
uncertainties in the realization of benefits from exercising political rights are likely to lead most 
individuals to value them less than they value the exercise of their civil liberties.  Empirical 
implications directly relevant for the evolution of democracy arising from this fundamental 
difference are testable but likely to require micro data or experiments.  Indirect ones, however, arise 
more easily as they underlie incentives behind the next two potential reasons for differences in the 
evolution of both political rights and civil liberties.  These potential reasons generate testable 
implications with aggregate data.    
In a representative democracy, the exercise of political rights by voters or politicians often acts as a 
constraint imposed on politicians or on a small groups of agents in a discrete manner – that is, at 
                                                      
3 Just as in the case of political rights, there are other indexes used empirically.  In contrast to the case of political rights, 
however, none of them have the same prominence that the Polity IV index has and, perhaps more importantly, their 




particular times and in particular contexts.  For instance, this would be the case for electoral 
supervision by competing parties or for separation of power conflicts between the executive and the 
legislature resolved by the judiciary.  By contrast, the exercise of civil liberties by citizens requires 
constraints imposed on the state that enhance the activities of all agents in a far less discrete or 
intermittent manner over time, space and individuals –that is, commitments to refrain from 
predation by protecting first and second generation human rights presumably apply all of the time 
and to all citizens, at least in modern times.  An important empirical implication of this feature that 
we will test is the following: civil liberties should exhibit greater persistence than political rights in 
their impact on their own subsequent outcomes.  Furthermore, the strength of the incentive toward 
persistence should also be greater for civil liberties than for political rights due to their direct rather 
than indirect impact on utility. 
There  are interactions in the production of these two dimensions of democracy that suggest 
precedence in time for some civil liberties relative to some political rights in specific settings.  For 
instance, civil liberties like freedoms of association and speech are naturally crucial for the 
emergence of competitive political parties that take part in free and fair elections.  Similarly, second 
generation human rights may also be important for the production of political rights if, for example, 
equitable access to education shapes the emergence of representative political leaders.  As a result, 
one can think of some civil liberties as precursors to some political rights.  An important empirical 
implication of this feature that we will also test is the following: one expects to observe empirical 
relationships where the levels of civil liberties would play a role in determining subsequent levels of 
political rights but perhaps not vice versa.  Once again the more direct nature of incentives for 
demanding civil liberties relative to those for demanding political rights reinforces a tendency for 
asymmetries in their evolution. 
An illustration of these asymmetries arises in a historical setting.  In an insightful paper on women’s 
rights and economic development, Fernandez (2012) develops a model that shows how economic 
growth leads men to prefer a system with equal rights for women to one where men enjoy a 
monopoly over rights.  A main implication of the model is that a decline in fertility induces men to 
reform the property rights system toward equal rights at an earlier date.  She tests this implication of 
the theory in the following manner.  First, she identifies two important property rights for women 




their earnings.  Second, she creates a dummy variable that dates when they were both first 
simultaneously available to women in different states of the contiguous USA.  Third, she uses this 
variable as her dependent variable and finds supporting evidence for her theory relying on data from 
the early 19th century to the 1920’s.  In the course of doing so she notes “…in general property 
rights preceded voting rights: only five states allowed women to vote prior to the reform of property 
rights.” 
Finally, a fourth reason for differential evolution of these dimensions is that rents generated by 
political rights are directly appropriable by politicians. That is, citizens’ enjoyment of political 
rights when acting in their role as politicians generate substantial rents as private goods that are 
concentrated in space, time and, of course, individuals, e.g., Keane and Merlo (2010) provide 
monetary estimates of these economic benefits in the US Congress.  By contrast citizens’ enjoyment 
of civil liberties generates substantial rents for society from the provision of these civil liberties as 
public goods.  These rents arise in two ways: indirectly through first generation human rights 
leading to innovations from knowledge creation and transmission, Aghion and Howitt (1998); and 
directly through second generation human rights leading to increased output from reductions of 
uncertainty and transaction costs and improved allocation of resources, which allow the operation of 
modern or ‘socially contrived’ markets at a high level of transactions, BenYishay and Betancourt 
(2010).   
For both first and second generation human rights, the rents generated through the enjoyment of 
these civil liberties tend to be more dispersed in space, time and individuals to whom they accrue 
than the ones generated through political rights.   This dispersion makes it more difficult for rent 
seekers to appropriate these rents, whether they be dictators or democratic politicians or anyone 
else, than the ones generated by political rights.  Thus, it generates another powerful reason for the 
differential evolution of political rights and civil liberties.  This differential appropriability of rents 
generated by political rights and civil liberties has been ignored in the literature to our knowledge.   
Mention should also be made in this context of a recent contribution that relies on our 
differentiation with respect to ease of appropriability between first and second generation human 
rights.  In a highly innovative paper, Czeglédi (2013) relies on this differential appropriability 




differences among cultures can lead to an equilibrium where governments provide a wider set of 
civil rights.  A key mechanism in obtaining this result is the larger increases in income (and thus 
return from rent-seeking activities by governments) that the civil rights with lower appropriability 
can generate.  He also provides supporting empirical evidence for the model. 
III.DATA SOURCES 
As our primary measures of the dimensions of democracy, we use the civil liberties (CL) and 
political rights (PR) data from Freedom House, which are available at annual intervals between 
1973 and 20094.  We focus our investigation on effects at 5-year intervals.  Both the CL and PR 
variables are measured on a 1-7 scale, with lower scores representing better conditions.  To make 
our results more easily interpretable, we convert these measures onto a [0, 1] scale, with higher 
scores representing better conditions.       
The Freedom House PR variable reflects three primary factors: (a) The fairness and freedom of the 
electoral process, (b) the ability of diverse individuals and groups to fully participate in the political 
process, including to gain power, and (c) the efficiency of the government in operating with 
accountability and with limited corruption and undue influence from the military, criminals, or 
other groups.  Freedom House’s CL measure, meanwhile, reflects four core dimensions: (a) 
Freedom of expression and belief, (b) rights to freely organize and associate with other individuals 
and groups, (c) law and order, supported by an independent judiciary and reflecting equal legal 
treatment of diverse populations, and (d) personal autonomy over property ownership as well as a 
variety of other rights, including the choice of residence, employment, marriage partners, and 
higher education institution.   
BenYishay and Betancourt (2010) discuss these sub-factors underlying the PR and CL variables in 
further detail and assess the relative influence of the sub-factors on long-run economic growth.  On 
the measurement side, these FH democracy indexes are known to have exhibited bias in the Cold 
War era when higher scores were assigned for regimes politically aligned with the US.  Initially, 
these characteristics were identified through mainly anecdotal evidence relying on the FH aggregate 
                                                      




index of political rights and civil liberties, e.g., Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán (2007).  More 
recently, however, they have been found to hold also on the basis of statistical analysis of the 
political rights index (Steiner 2012).  The biases in the indexes appear to have diminished in the 
post-Cold War era.  To ensure this bias does not drive our results, we conduct sensitivity analyses 
that vary the time intervals used for the analysis.  Given the time-varying nature of the bias in the 
indexes, such variation in the time span of the analysis would yield differing estimates if this bias is 
driving the results.  If we find little change in the estimates across time spans, we can conclude that 
the pro-US bias in the Cold War era ratings is unlikely to be responsible for our results.   
We construct our base sample by focusing on those countries in which the FH PR and CL data and 
income data are available in the 1970-2000 time period.  We begin with the sample of countries for 
which FH data is available and impute the 1970 CL and PR values using the earliest observation in 
1973.5  We then restrict our data to those country-year observations with income data from the Penn 
World Tables [PWT] (version 6.3, benchmarked to 2005 PPP dollars).  As noted by Benhabib et al. 
(2011), version 6.3 of the PWT includes many observations that were missing from previous 
versions (including version 6.1, used by AJRY).6    Our data thus includes 915 observations in 175 
countries over the reference time period. 
For purposes of understanding the basic dynamic interactions of CL and PR, we limit our analysis 
to a balanced panel of 131 countries for which the full time series of CL and PR are available for 
the 1970-2000 period.  Unbalanced panels can generate consistent estimates with greater precision 
when the reason for the observations’ exclusion is uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the 
regression of interest.  However, in our case, countries that enter the sample mid-period are 
typically those that are newly independent and are likely to experience quite different dynamics in 
                                                      
5 AJRY also further supplement this data with data from Bollen (1990, 2001) for political rights in 1950, 1955, 
1960, and 1965, obtaining 945 observations for these countries.  Because comparable data are not available for 
CL for these early years, we restrict our sample to the years 1970-2000. When we replicate AJRY’s estimation 
using this subsample, we find qualitatively similar results for the effects of GDP per capita on political rights. 
These results are reported in column 2 of Appendix Table A2.    
6 These new country-years observations are spread over 40 countries, and are quite different from those that 
AJRY use in their estimation: The levels of political and civil freedoms in these countries are much lower than 
those in the AJRY sample, and while their mean levels of income are comparable to those in the AJRY sample, 
their changes in income over this time period are significantly lower. When we replicate AJRY’s estimation 
adding these new observations from version 6.3, we also find qualitatively similar results for the effects of GDP 




their PR and CL from previously existing countries.  As a result, we focus on the balanced panel for 
purposes of estimating the basic dynamics.  Summary statistics for this sample are shown in part A 
of Table 1.  Incidentally, the simple correlation between political rights and civil liberties across 
countries in this sample is 0.92 (this measure incorporates both cross-country and within-country 
correlation, while our fixed effects regressions examine only the latter). 
When we revisit AJRY’s results on income and democracy in Appendix Table A2, for example, we 
return to our initial sample.  One of the instruments used in AJRY is the savings rate.  We also 
make use of the updated PWT data on government and private consumption to calculate the 
national savings rate, data which are available for 866 observations for 162 countries in our 
sample.7  We report summary statistics for the main variables in this initial sample in part B of 
Table 1.      
For the analysis of other determinants of democracy in Section VI, we make use of several 
additional data sources.  When examining the relationship between oil and democracy, we 
constructed a separate sample of country observations for which reliable oil reserve data are 
available.  The data on oil reserves come from Dr. Colin Campbell at the Association for the Study 
of Peak Oil (ASPO), a non-profit organization gathering industrial data to study the dates and 
impact of the peak and decline of world oil.  These data are a particularly useful source because 
they include oil discoveries and thus permit credible computation of real changes in oil reserves. 
The total oil reserves in this dataset are measured as the cumulative quantity of oil discoveries 
minus the cumulative quantity of oil production as of year t.  Thus, changes in reserves in a given 
period reflect the net change in discoveries and production over that period.  Cotet and Tsui (2010) 
describe these advantages of the ASPO data on reserves over other data sources in more detail.   
For five former Soviet countries, we impute missing pre-1991 observations by fitting their post-
1991 data on that of several comparator countries (Canada, Great Britain and Romania) and 
predicting the pre-1991 reserves based on these comparator observations (we verify in a robustness 
check that these observations do not drive our results).  We thus obtain data on oil reserves for 77 
                                                      
7 AJRY relied on these data to obtain 2SLS estimates.  We replicate their 2SLS estimation for PR with both their 
original sample of countries and our extended sample. Again the results are qualitatively similar, which can be 




countries that have at least one period with positive reserves.  Part C of Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for these countries.  We impute oil reserves as 0 for all countries not included in the ASPO 
dataset.   Thus, for our analysis of other determinants of democracy we start with the same set of 
131 countries and 786 observations in our original balanced sample.  In analyses with oil in the data 
set (tables 8, 9 and A6), we re-scale the oil variable to be measured in 10 trillion barrels for ease of 
interpreting coefficients.   
We obtain data on educational attainment from the Barro and Lee (2010) dataset, which includes 
age-specific mean years of education at five year intervals between 1970 and 2000 (the complete 
dataset extends to 1950-2010).  To construct the parental generations’ educational attainment, we 
follow Barro and Lee (2010) and calculate the mean years of education for all those aged 40 to 75 
(weighted by each cohort’s population share).  These data generate a reduced set of 708 
observations in a balanced sample of 118 countries.     
Finally, we add data on total population counts and the urban share of the population from the 
World Development Indicators.  These data generate 768 observations in a balanced sample of 128 
countries for the demographic variables.  We also use the Muslim share of the population from the 
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life to split the sample, which is explained in Section VII. 
IV.BASIC DYNAMICS OF UNBUNDLED DEMOCRACY: LEAST 
SQUARES RESULTS 
Our conceptual framework highlights a variety of factors that may cause PR and CL to move 
jointly, sequentially, or independently of one another.  We now turn to assessing the empirical 
evidence on these dynamics.  We begin by examining the dynamic evolution of these two variables 
in simple terms, which are captured in Table 2.  We first introduce persistence effects by 
themselves, controlling for year effects, in a balanced panel of 131 countries for the years 1975-
2000 and present the results in columns (1) and (2).  Our panel relies on 5 year intervals to capture 
longer term changes while retaining a time series dimension.  These simple regressions suggest 
strong persistence effects for both dimensions of democracy in terms of magnitude and a high level 




Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 allow us to examine the effect of heterogeneity across countries in their 
dynamic evolution by introducing country fixed effects into each of the regressions. The latter 
effects capture the impact of any variables that vary across countries but remain fixed over time. 
The latter would include, for example, the lowest level of civil liberties or political rights during the 
period and the smallest and largest difference between both of them.  What these columns reveal is 
that country fixed effects improve explanatory power, by 10% or more, and—not surprisingly—
substantially reduce the magnitude of the impact of persistence effects for both political rights and 
civil liberties—a reduction of more than 50% in each case. The country fixed effects are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   
It is well known that the introduction of fixed effects biases the coefficients of lagged dependent 
variables towards zero, which is referred to as dynamic panel bias. Whatever the size of this bias, 
however, both persistence coefficients remain positive and are statistically significant at the 0.1% 
level after the introduction of fixed effects.  Furthermore, the persistence coefficients with and 
without fixed effects provide weak evidence in favor of one of the two empirical implications 
identified in Section II: namely, stronger persistence effects for civil liberties than for political 
rights.  
On the descriptive side, the differences in explanatory power between both equations suggest that 
lagged CL explains current CL somewhat better than lagged PR explains current PR with and 
without fixed effects.  Moreover, the introduction of fixed effects (in columns 3 and 4) shows that 
between country variation represents a similar proportion of the unexplained variation by the 
persistence effect for political rights and for civil liberties (1-R2 in columns 1 and 2), i.e., 
(.096/.280=.343) versus (.079/.231=.342).  
By looking at outliers over the sample period, one observes that Panama in 1985, Honduras in 1975 
and Ecuador in 1975 have the largest difference between civil liberties and political rights (i.e., CL 
– PR).  If we look at the same information in 2000 (the final year in our sample), we find that the 
difference had disappeared in all three cases (in the case of Panama, PR had actually improved 
beyond CL).  In all three countries, however, political rights had improved substantially and civil 




On the other hand, we see a different dynamic when looking at the three outliers with the largest 
differences between PR and CL (i.e., PR – CL) over the sample period (India, Sri Lanka, and 
Syria).  In two cases (India and Sri Lanka), political rights had remained unchanged by 2000; these 
rights had actually decreased in Syria. Over the same time period, civil liberties experienced no 
change in one case (Syria), a minor increase in another (Sri Lanka) and a substantial one in the third 
(India).  Superficially, it seems better for democratic outcomes to start with higher levels of CL than 
of PR, which is consistent with the other empirical implication identified in Section II. 
Of course, both civil liberties and political rights vary during the sample period.  Thus a fuller 
insight into the dynamics of their evolution suggests that we consider what happens when we 
introduce the possibilities of interactions into the regressions directly.  Columns 5 and 6 allow us to 
look at their full effect by introducing them without the country fixed effects.  The introduction of 
lagged civil liberties in the political rights equation (column 5) reduces the persistence effect of 
political rights in column 1 by 44%, while the introduction of lagged political rights (column 6) 
reduces the persistence effect of civil liberties in column 2 by 15%.  This suggests that part of the 
reduction in the persistence effect in columns 3 and 4 has nothing to do with dynamic panel bias. 
Perhaps more importantly, the effect of lagged civil liberties on political rights is positive and 
marginally greater in magnitude than the persistence effect of political rights, whereas the 
persistence effect of civil liberties is 6 times larger than the effect of lagged political rights on civil 
liberties, which is also positive. All four coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.   
Undoubtedly, these two dimensions of democracy seem to evolve in very different ways. First, the 
persistence effect of civil liberties is now much stronger than the persistence effect of political 
rights, which corroborates the first empirical implication identified in section II on a far stronger 
statistical basis.  Supporting this, we find that the 95 % confidence interval on the PR persistence 
effect does not overlap with the 95% confidence interval on the bigger CL persistence effect.  
Second, civil liberties and political rights have (positive) complementary effects on each other. 
Furthermore, the complementary effect of CL (in column 5) is more than twice the size of the 
complementary effect of PR (in column 6).  Moreover, their 95% confidence intervals do not 
overlap either. This provides strong statistical corroboration for the second empirical implication 
identified in section II, namely that civil liberties play an important role in determining subsequent 




While adding lagged civil liberties to the political rights equation increases the R2 by 4%, adding 
political rights to the civil liberties equation increases the R2 by only 0.5%.  These descriptive 
differences in explanatory power between columns 5 and 6 and 1 and 2, respectively, generate a 
very different result than the introduction of fixed effects. To wit, the introduction of the 
complementary factors (5 and 6) shows that variations in lagged CL capture a much greater 
proportion of the unexplained variation by PR’s persistence effect (.029/.280=.104) than variations 
in lagged PR capture of the unexplained variation by CL’s persistence effect (.004/.231=.017). This 
result is substantially different than the introduction of fixed effects, which has an almost equivalent 
impact on the R2 in both equations.   
Finally, we can see the impact of the within-country variation in these two variables on each other 
by adding country fixed effects to the specification in columns 5 and 6. The results are presented in 
columns 7 and 8.  First, the persistence effect of political rights is cut by two thirds and it is no 
longer statistically significant at the 1% level, although it remains so at the 5% level. Meanwhile the 
persistence effect of civil liberties, while cut by 56%, remains statistically significant at the 0.1 % 
level and substantial in magnitude, e.g., more than twice the size of the political rights persistence 
effect.  Second, the impact of lagged civil liberties on political rights is greater than its own 
persistence effect, more than twice the magnitude of the political rights persistence effect as well as 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level.  By contrast the impact of lagged political rights on civil 
liberties becomes insubstantial in magnitude and is not statistically significant even at the 10% 
level.   
Summing up, our descriptive comparisons indicated that, once both lagged CL and PR are included 
in the regression, fixed effects add the same amount of explanatory power in terms of R2 to the 
regressions for both PR and CL (namely, 0.076).  On the substantive side, civil liberties are far 
more powerful in improving democratic outcomes in both dimensions than political rights.  Both 
CL’s persistence effect and its complementary effect on PR are much stronger in magnitude and 
statistical significance than PR’s persistence effect or its complementary effect on CL.  Thus, these 
two dimensions of democracy are complementary in their evolution and exhibit the two empirical 
implications identified in our conceptual framework.  These results are novel as well as important.  





V. BASIC DYNAMICS OF UNBUNDLED DEMOCRACY: DYNAMIC 
PANEL BIAS 
A systematic way of exploring the role of dynamic panel bias is facilitated by the introduction of 
some notation.  The results presented in Table 2 from OLS estimation for each democracy outcome 
variable can be summarized in terms of the more general specification in columns 7 and 8, (j =1, 2; 
Democ i1t = PR it , Democ i2t = CL it ) as follows:     
Democijt = αj PRijt-1 +βj CLijt-1 + γij + δtj +Єijt                    (1) 
where γij is a country-specific fixed effect in the jth equation and δtj is a year-specific fixed effect. 
Using lagged dependent variables as regressors introduces dynamic panel bias because  those lags 
will themselves be correlated with previous observations’ error terms (i.e., CLit-1 will be correlated 
with Є1it for s < t).  While this bias disappears as the number of periods increases (as T ―› ∞), our 
sample includes only 5 periods.  A starting point to address this issue is the instrumental variables 
(IV) approach proposed by Anderson-Hsiao (1982).  This requires specification of the model in first 
differences and the use of two-period lags of PR and CL as instruments for the respective first 
differences.  This leads to a consistent estimator through OLS estimation of the following first 
difference specification    
ΔDemocit,t-1= α1 ΔPRit-1,t-2 +β1 ΔCLit-1,t-2 +Δδt,t-1 +ΔЄ1it,t-1         (2) 
While consistent in the absence of second-order autocorrelation in levels, this estimator is 
inefficient. The Arellano and Bond (1991) difference Generalized Method of Moments  estimator 
(DGMM) improves on the efficiency provided by the Anderson-Hsiao IV estimator by using 
available lags greater than two periods as instruments in the difference equations.  Presence of first 
order serial correlation in the error terms of the levels equations, however, would also lead to 
invalid instruments in DGMM, as this correlation makes the two period lagged levels invalid 
instruments for the one period lagged differences.  One solution is to restrict the instrument set to 




It has been noted in the literature that the DGMM estimator can also suffer from the problem of 
weak instruments.  A proposed solution for this problem is to rely on system generalized method of 
moments (SGMM), Arellano and Bover (1995), by adding (stacking) the level equations and using 
first differences as instruments for the levels while still checking for serial correlation to ensure the 
validity of the instruments.  This solution is valid provided the assumption of zero correlation 
between the deviations of the dynamically evolving variables from their long run means and fixed 
effects holds, Roodman (2009).   
In any event, Table 3 presents the results of these alternative ways of correcting for dynamic panel 
bias for PR and CL.  The assumption of no serial correlation in levels for two period lags, AR(2), is 
rejected at the 10% level in 3 of the 4 cases where it is relevant (columns 1, 2, and 4) and for three 
period lags, AR(3), in none of the 4 cases where it is relevant( columns 5, 6, 7 and 8). The 
assumption that all the instruments are valid (Hansen’s J test, Hansen 1982) is rejected at the 10% 
level in 3 of the 6 cases where it is relevant (columns 3, 4 and 6) and the hypothesis that the subset 
of instruments for the differences (difference in Hansen J test) are valid is not rejected at the 10 % 
level in the two cases where it is relevant (columns 7, and 8).   Thus, columns 7 and 8 provide the 
more reliable estimates econometrically.   
What are the substantive implications of these results? After correcting for dynamic panel bias we 
confirm both empirical implications of our conceptual framework. First, the persistence effect of 
civil liberties is statistically significant at the 5% level, substantial in magnitude and almost ten 
times greater than the persistence effect of political rights.  The latter is small in magnitude and not 
statistically significant at any reasonable level. Second, the complementary effect of civil liberties 
on political rights is statistically significant at the 1% level, substantial in magnitude and ten times 
greater than the complementary effect of political rights on civil liberties.  The latter is small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant at any reasonable level.   More generally all of the other 
results corrected for dynamic panel bias in table 3 are consistent with both empirical implications of 
our conceptual framework.  This is the case regardless of whether or not they suffer from second 
order serial correlation or fail to satisfy the over-identification restrictions.  




In this section, we explore the effects on our results of introducing per capita income as an 
explanatory variable for each dimension of democracy.  If Lipset’s view of modernization is correct 
and per capita income is an important determinant of either or both dimensions of democracy, our 
earlier results might suffer from an omitted variable bias if per capita income is correlated with 
either lagged CL or lagged PR.  If the AJRY view is correct and per capita income has no effect on 
democracy, this variable should not have an effect on our results.  
Table 4 presents the results of introducing per capita income into the regressions in Section IV 
following the practice of both camps of lagging this variable one period.  In the first half of Table 4, 
we see the results of doing so without fixed effects. Just as in the previous section, the two basic 
empirical implications of our conceptual framework are supported by the data.  Columns 1 and 2 of 
this table show the same results as columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.  Namely, the persistence effect of 
CL is stronger than that of PR and their 95 % confidence intervals do not overlap; similarly, the 
complementary effect of CL on PR is stronger than that of PR on CL and their 95% confidence 
intervals do not overlap.  In these two regressions, per capita income has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on both dimensions of democracy at the 5% level, but our main empirical 
implications are unaffected.  
The next two columns of Table 4 correct for the endogeneity of per capita income with 2SLS using 
the two-period lagged savings rate as an instrument, which is the same instrument as used by AJRY.  
Allowing for endogeneity, our two main empirical implications continue to hold the same as before 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.  The main change is that per capita income now becomes statistically 
insignificant at the 5 % level as a determinant of either dimension of democracy. Nonetheless, it 
remains statistically significant at the 10% level for PR.  Incidentally, the literature on democracy 
and income often ignores this correction for the endogeneity of per capita income without fixed 
effects.  It attributes the difficulties in establishing the impact of per capita income on democracy to 
fixed effects.  Our results show that this difficulty exists even without fixed effects once 
endogeneity is accounted for in the estimation.   
In the second half of Table 4, country fixed effects are introduced in both sets of regressions, which 
make them comparable to columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.    Our two main empirical implications 




of PR substantively and statistically whether or not we correct for endogeneity.  Indeed, at either the 
0.1% or the 1% level of significance the persistence effect of PR is not significantly different from 
zero while the one for CL is and remains substantial in both cases.   Second, the complementary 
effect of CL on PR is substantial and statistically significant at the 0.1% level in both sets of 
regressions. By contrast the complementary effect of PR on CL becomes insubstantial (1/5 or less 
than that of CL on PR) and statistically insignificant at any reasonable level of significance.  
Summing up, whether or not per capita income is included in the regressions makes no difference to 
our least squares results on the two main empirical implications of the conceptual framework.    
In Table A3 of the Appendix we perform a sensitivity analysis that shows our main two empirical 
implications hold in a variety of alternative circumstances that also include lagged per capita 
income as an explanatory variable. These are: estimation with 3SLS; use of a shorter balanced panel 
(1980-2000); dropping observations due to outliers selected on the basis of Kennedy’s DFBeta 
procedure (2008: Chapter 20); and, dropping savings rate outliers selected by eliminating 
observations outside the 5th  and 95th percentile of values for the savings rate.  Our two main 
empirical implications hold without exception in all these settings.  
Finally we introduce lagged per capita income in the GMM estimations of Table 3 again using the 
two period lagged savings rate as an instrument for lagged per capita income. The results are 
presented in Table 5.  Once again the more reliable results econometrically are the ones in columns 
7 and 8.  These results support our two main empirical implications as strongly as the corresponding 
ones in Table 3.  Thus, whether or not per capita income is included in the GMM estimation makes 
no difference to our main results.  Incidentally the pattern of the results with respect to per capita 
income is similar to what is found in the literature: Namely a negative coefficient with DGMM as in 
AJRY (2008) and a positive coefficient with SGMM as in Che et al (2012).  
VII. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In this section we consider the sensitivity of our results to several issues.  First, the extent to which 
our basic results are affected by the discrete nature of the FH variables, the political rights index 
used, and the timeframe studied.  Second, we consider the extent to which our findings would differ 




our findings would differ by incorporating the main variables, other than income and lagged values 
of PR & CL of course, used in prior literature as determinants of democracy.  That is, the extent to 
which these variables are acting as possible omitted variables and biasing our results when left out 
of the estimation. 
1.Basic Dynamics Revisited 
In Table A4 of the appendix, we consider whether the constrained nature of the Freedom House PR 
and CL measures affects our results.  We begin by dropping boundary observations—either at the 
lower bound of zero or at the upper bound of 1—and repeating our baseline fixed effects 
specifications (those in columns 7 and 8 of Table 2).  We find our results largely unaffected 
(columns 1-4).   Indeed at the 1% level of statistical significance, the ‘largely’ can be eliminated 
from the previous sentence.  
We find very similar results when we use the Polity IV index instead of the FH PR measure 
(columns 5-6 of Table A4) as our measure of political rights.  That is the persistence effect is higher 
for civil liberties than for this measure of political rights and the confidence intervals don’t overlap.  
Furthermore, the complementarity effect of civil liberties on political rights is substantial in 
magnitude and statistically significant at the 0.1% level whereas the alternative political rights 
measure has no statistically discernible effect on civil liberties even at the 5% level.  This result also 
provides reassuring indirect evidence that whatever Cold War era bias may have affected the 
Freedom House political rights index, it is not driving our findings.   
Timeframe changes provide direct evidence that Cold War bias in the FH indexes is not driving the 
results.  In columns 7-8, we extended the sample timeframe beyond that of AJRY, adding FH data 
from 2005 and 2010.   The additional observations provide greater precision, reducing our standard 
errors and making the coefficients on PR statistically significant in both regressions at the 5% level.  
Nonetheless, the complementarity effect of PR on CL remains statistically insignificant at the 1% 
level and substantially smaller in magnitude than the complementarity effect of CL on PR, just as 
before.  Finally, in columns 9-12, we vary the intervals in our panel framework from 5-year 
windows to 3- and 7-year windows.  Although we find stronger own-lag effects in the shorter 3-
year intervals, we continue to see much larger cross-effects from CL than PR.  In the longer 7-year 




2. Unbalanced Panel Results: Democracy and Income Revisited 
In Table 6, we present the least squares results analogous to Table 4 but relying on the unbalanced 
panel data set described in Section III.  While there are some minor differences in details, the two 
main implications of our analysis continue to hold.  For instance, among the minor differences are 
three coefficients in Table 4 that were statistically significant at the 5 or 10% level that become 
statistically insignificant in Table 6.  Nevertheless, our two main results are not affected.  The 
persistence effect of CL is substantially greater than the persistence effect of PR and statistically 
significant at the 0.1 % level in all four sets of regression in Table 6.  Similarly, the 
complementarity effect of CL on PR exists and is statistically significant at the 0.1% level while the 
complementarity effect of PR on CL is much smaller in the two regressions without fixed effects 
and it does not exist at the 10% level in the two regressions with fixed effects.  Incidentally, the R2 
in the corresponding OLS regressions differs between the two tables only in the third decimal! 
In Table 7, we present the dynamic panel bias correction results analogous to Table 5 but relying on 
the unbalanced panel.  There is a lot more variability in the results for each of the corresponding 
estimations in Tables 5 and 7 with respect to the magnitude and the statistical significance of 
coefficient estimates.  Nevertheless, the same inferences as before can be drawn for our two main 
results based on the coefficients of the preferred estimations in both tables, i.e., SGMM with three 
lags as instruments.  The persistence effect of CL is substantially greater than the persistence effect 
of PR and statistically significant at the 5% level in both tables.  Similarly, the complementarity 
effect of CL on PR exists and is statistically significant at the 1% level while the complementarity 
effect of PR on CL does not exist at any reasonable level in both tables.  Thus, our two main results 
are found in both the balanced and unbalanced panel and with both estimation methods. 
Yet a word of caution is in order when using unbalanced panels.  While the results on third order 
autocorrelation and on the Hansen J-test for the validity of restrictions are reasonably satisfied with 
SGMM estimation using the balanced panel for both equations (Table 5), these same tests raise 
doubts about the validity of the results with SGMM estimation using the unbalanced panel for the 
civil liberties equation (Table 7).  More generally, however, the least square results are hardly 




substantially affected.  In the latter case, the balanced panel results should inspire greater 
confidence.  
3. Omitted Variable Bias:  Other Potential Determinants of Democracy 
In this section, we investigate the impact of other potential determinants of democracy on our 
earlier results.  We rely on the prior literature discussed in the introduction for guidance on the 
choice of variables to consider, but we improve the data or the estimation procedure whenever 
feasible.  Just as in previous sections, we begin with the least squares results.  In contrast to those 
sections, however, we skip the usual OLS results and go directly to the ones that account for a 
variety of econometric problems associated with these new variables.   These results, which also 
include country and time fixed effects just as before, are presented in Table 8.   
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 present the results of adding to the 2SLS estimations in Section VI 
(columns 7 and 8 of Table 4) the log of population.  In order to account for both the potential 
endogeneity of this variable due to reverse causality with democratization as in Alesina and 
Spolaore (1997) and/or the effect of population momentum as in Keyfitz (1971), we use population 
lagged three periods (i.e., 15 years) as an instrument.  Our earlier results on the persistence and 
complementarity effects of civil liberties relative to political rights go through exactly as before, as 
can be seen through a comparison with the corresponding columns of Table 4.  Moreover, 
population’s impact on either dimension of democracy is statistically insignificant at any reasonable 
level.   
Next, we consider the role of education on unbundled democracy while accounting for endogeneity 
by following Barro and Lee (2010) and using the average education of the parents’ generation to 
instrument for education levels lagged one period.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 present these 
results.  Once again, the earlier results on the persistence and complementarity of civil liberties 
relative to political rights continue to hold just as before.  Education, however, has a statistically 
insignificant impact on unbundled democracy at any reasonable level of significance.  Adding the 
level of female education instrumented with average education of mothers yields the same results as 
above (these are not presented for brevity).  We present the results of adding urbanization by itself, 
again using its three period lag as an instrument. Columns 5 and 6 present the results, which are 




hypothesis affects our basic results on the persistence and complementarity of civil liberties relative 
to political rights. 
Finally, we try to capture exogenous variation in natural resource wealth through our measurement 
of oil resources.  Oil is one variable that makes the empirical impact of the economic natural 
resource curse most salient, (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2006).  Furthermore, as noted in the 
introduction, it has been shown to generate a political natural resource curse in the case of 
democratization when measured in terms of endowments.  The general literature on 
democratization, however, has relied on oil exports (either in absolute value or relative to GDP) or 
dummy variables related to them, e.g., Barro (1999) or Benhabib et al (2011) and on oil rents, 
Hegre et al (2012).  Oil rents are defined as (price – cost)* production but the latter quantity in 
particular can be a source of reverse causality with respect to institutional variables such as 
democratization.  
Use of data on quantity of oil reserves as a proxy for oil rents mitigates endogeneity problems, as 
changes in these reserves are primarily related to endowment changes through discoveries and can 
thus be viewed as exogenous.  We use oil reserves lagged three five year periods (i.e., 15 years) 
because the lag between discovery and first production is often two to ten years long (Laherrere 
2003).   In addition, these longer lags are useful given the inclusion of lagged values of the two 
dimensions of democracy in our regressions.  Finally, the time fixed effects are likely to account for 
changes in global oil prices that affect contemporaneous oil rents.   
Results are presented in the last two columns of Table 8.  They show that the persistence and 
complementarity effects of civil liberties relative to political rights continue to hold just as before.  
Interestingly, the political resource curse on democratization through political rights found by Tsui 
(2011) holds in this setting at the 5% level of significance, but there is no such effect for civil 
liberties.   Finally, in the appendix (table A5) we present comparable results using OLS and one 
period lags for all the variables mentioned above, except for female education and oil reserves.  We 
also present results for two OLS regressions with all the variables, including female education and 
oil reserves, at the same time in the last two columns.  Our two main results on civil liberties 




In Table 9, we consider the corresponding results to Table 8 while correcting for dynamic panel 
bias with SGMM.  With respect to persistence and complementarity effects the overall results in the 
first two rows of Table 9 are very similar to what we found before, especially with respect to the 
complementarity effect.  The latter is substantial and statistically significant, at least at the 10% 
level, in all four cases (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7).  The complementarity effect for PR (columns 2, 4, 6 
and 8) is always statistically insignificant at any reasonable level.  The persistence effect for CL is 
always substantial in size, and statistically significant at the 5% level in two of the four cases 
(columns 2 and 4) whereas the persistence effect for PR is statistically insignificant at any 
reasonable level in all four cases (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7).   
With respect to covariates, the results are slightly more varied than in Table 8:  population is 
positive for PR and statistically significant at the 10 % level (column 1); education is also positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for CL (column 4); and urbanization is also positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level for CL (column 6).  Tests of over-identifying restrictions 
and auto correlation are all satisfied at reasonable levels, except perhaps for the Hansen J-test in 
column 3, which is close to but still below 10% for PR in the education regression.  Note that, while 
we have the same 131 countries in both tables, Table 9 has far fewer observations than Table 8.  For 
completeness, we present the results for the corresponding specifications with DGMM in table A6 
of the Appendix.  They are quite similar to those in Table 9 summarized above. 
Last but not least we turn to the impact of the proportion of Muslims in the population on 
democratization.  We were unable to obtain enough reliable data over time periods on this variable 
to perform exactly the same exercise as before.  Instead we use the most reliable data source that 
included all of our 131 countries (the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life8) to split the sample 
into a similar number of countries with a low proportion of Muslims (<2.5%) and a high proportion 
of Muslims (>= 2.5%) and re-estimated our basic results on these split samples.  Table 10 presents 
the results in two parts. The first part shows the OLS results; the second part shows the SGMM 
results correcting for dynamic panel bias.  Both sets of results confirm our earlier findings on the 
complementarity and persistence effect of civil liberties relative to political rights for both samples.  
                                                      
8 Available at http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population.  We use the estimated Muslim population as a 




As a check we also re-estimated our basic results for a much smaller sample with a higher cut-off 
for proportion of Muslims (>50%) and again the complementarity and persistence effects of civil 
liberties relative to political rights were  very similar to earlier findings for both OLS and SGMM. 
These results are presented in table A7 of the Appendix. 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Summing up, we have shown that liberal democracy as construed by Tilly in terms of two 
dimensions, political rights and civil liberties, provides an encompassing framework for analyzing 
the evolution of democracy at both the conceptual and empirical level.  At the conceptual level, it 
contains electoral democracy as construed by Schumpeter and his followers as a special case in 
which civil liberties and political rights are independent dimensions of democracy and only the 
latter matter.  At the empirical level, we have shown that a framework based on liberal democracy 
overwhelmingly dominates a framework based on electoral democracy as a basis for analyzing the 
evolution of democracy.   
Conceptually, the encompassing feature is grounded in the differentiation provided by the ability of 
civil liberties to provide citizens with satisfaction directly while political rights only do so 
indirectly.  Empirically, this fundamental difference and other associated differences between civil 
liberties and political rights generate a setting where these two dimensions of unbundled democracy 
evolve in very different ways.  First, the persistence effects of civil liberties on subsequent 
outcomes are substantial and statistically robust to the inclusion of political rights in the analysis.  
By contrast, the persistence effects of political rights on subsequent outcomes are far less 
substantial and most often disappear statistically when civil liberties are included in the analysis.  
Second, the complementarity effects of civil liberties on political rights are substantial and robust, 
whereas the complementarity effects of political rights on civil liberties are largely non-existent 
substantively and statistically.    
Our empirical results were obtained with the type of cross-country panel data employed to analyze 
these issues in the political economy and political science literature.  Thus, one of the immediate 
implications of our analysis is to consider the extent to which similar results hold in a variety of 




feature of our analysis is a conceptual basis driven by differences between dimensions on whether 
they yield utility directly or indirectly to citizens.  Hence, it makes sense to consider the design of 
laboratory and/or field experiments aimed at establishing the extent to which different individuals 
value civil liberties differently from political rights.  A variant of this idea would be to design either 
type of experiment to evaluate the trade-offs that are made between political rights and civil 
liberties in different types of cultural or political settings.   
A similar implication with respect to other types of data would be to search the historical literature 
in pursuit of events in which segments of the population acquired a particular aspect of civil 
liberties or of political rights.  For instance, these events could be historical moments when the right 
to own property or the right to vote was acquired.  If either historical data or specific surveys 
containing data on other political rights or civil liberties were available, one could investigate the 
impact of acquiring these particular aspects on other aspects of civil liberties or political rights. 
While the above implications would address the extent to which the validity of our results holds in a 
wider range of settings, they would require a fair amount of effort and ingenuity in their 
implementation.   Other implications for existing literature, however, provide contexts that are 
easier to implement as they would rely on more easily available data.  We mention a few different 
ones below to illustrate the point.   
By focusing on the democratization process, we have emphasized the differential role of political 
rights and civil liberties in the evolution of unbundled democracy.   Nonetheless, similar differential 
roles arise with respect to the considerable literature on many other aspects of democracy.  In all 
these cases, the omission of civil liberties from the empirical analysis generates the possibilities of 
substantially different results once they are included. To wit, this consideration applies to the 
research on the duration and stability of democracy that has arisen after the work of Przeworski, et 
al (2000).  It also applies to the literature on the impact of short-run aggregate shocks on democracy 
mentioned in the introduction.  
More generally, the omission of civil liberties from empirical analysis also applies to issues of 
regime stability, e.g., Morrison (2009).  Once political rights and civil liberties are viewed as taking 
on a range of values rather than as a binary condition, it is easier to see why both might matter even 




from socialism have also focused on political rights and structural reforms to the neglect of civil 
liberties.  This is the case even among the more careful works relying on case studies, e.g., Haggard 
and Kaufman (2008).   
Perhaps the most important policy implication of our analysis is that in promoting democracy, it 
makes sense to emphasize the provision of civil liberties.  Our empirical findings suggest that at 
least some civil liberties are necessary for political rights but the reverse is not the case.  Free and 
fair elections are necessary for democracy, but they are far from sufficient.   Part of their value is 
that by conferring legitimacy on the winners, they prevent the loss of life and property associated 
with other mechanisms for transferring power inter-temporally.  By the same token, however, they 
provide no legitimacy for the trampling of civil liberties associated with illiberal democracies.   
Last but not least, we note explicitly two complementary links between our approach and an 
important recent strand of literature, i.e., North, Wallis and Weingast (2009).  First, these authors 
are up-front in their preface emphasizing the presentation of a conceptual framework rather than 
“…a formal model that generates explicit empirical tests…about social change (p.xii).”  We also 
have a conceptual framework rather than a formal model, albeit a far more limited one, but it 
generates explicit empirical tests.  Furthermore, we have paid a substantial amount of attention to 
the measurement of political rights and civil liberties and to extracting explicit empirical tests about 
social change involving political rights and civil liberties.  This aspect of our approach provides one 
complementary link with their work.  A second one relates to the door-step conditions for 
transitions to an open social order in the economic and political realm (ch.5).  They can be viewed 
as mechanisms for attaining high levels of political rights and especially of civil liberties.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 




Num obs Mean SD Min Max 
CL 131 786 0.499 0.321 0.00 1.00 
PR 131 786 0.495 0.373 0.00 1.00 
 




Num obs Mean SD Min Max 
CL 175 915 0.510 0.320 0.00 1.00 
PR 175 915 0.514 0.374 0.00 1.00 
Ln GDP pc 175 915 8.485 1.153 5.03 11.31 
Savings rate (t-2) 162 866 14.850 26.331 -243.30 85.74 
 




Num obs Mean SD Min Max 
CL 77 409 0.493 0.323 0.00 1.00 
PR 77 409 0.510 0.382 0.00 1.00 
Total oil reserves 77 409 170,839 1,274,760 0.00 12,999,827 
Per capita oil  77 409 0.377 1.635 0.00 19.48 





Table 2: Unbundling Democracy, Least Squares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Effects?  No country FEs With country FEs No country FEs With country FEs 
Dependent 
Variable  
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
          
PR (t-1) 0.838***  0.348***  0.464*** 0.122** 0.146* 0.0644 
 (0.022)  (0.058)  (0.060) (0.038) (0.071) (0.046) 
CL (t-1)  0.861***  0.377*** 0.471*** 0.734*** 0.351*** 0.320*** 
  (0.017)  (0.046) (0.064) (0.043) (0.079) (0.051) 
         
Country FE N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 786 786 786 786 786 786 786 786 
R-squared 0.717 0.769 0.813 0.848 0.746 0.773 0.822 0.849 
Num countries 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 




Table 3: Unbundling Democracy, GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 IV Difference GMM  
(2+ lags as instruments) 
Difference GMM  
(3+ lags as instruments) 
System GMM  
(3+ lags as instruments) 
Dependent Variable PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR (t-1) 0.371** 0.125 0.171 0.204 -0.363 0.0782 0.0697 0.0797 
 (0.130) (0.090) (0.215) (0.179) (0.361) (0.294) (0.254) (0.195) 
CL (t-1) 0.229+ 0.410*** 0.511* 0.459* 1.053** 0.505 0.933** 0.600* 
 (0.134) (0.088) (0.202) (0.199) (0.366) (0.331) (0.315) (0.304) 
Observations 655 655 655 655 524 524 524 524 
Num countries 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Num instruments   25 25 16 16 23 23 
Lags as instruments 2 2 2+ 2+ 3+ 3+ 3+ 3+ 
p-value for ...         
AR(2) 0.0988 0.0058 0.208 0.0320     
AR(3)     0.146 0.133 0.341 0.132 
Hansen J   0.0356 0.0340 0.313 0.0677 0.256 0.262 
Diff-in-Hansen (Lagged differences, null: difference subset is exogenous)    0.821 0.960 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 .  Robust two-step standard errors estimated with Windmiejer (2005) small-sample corrections in parentheses.  Year fixed effects 




Table 4: Democracy and Income, Least Squares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Effects No Country FE Country FE 
Estimation OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable: PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR (t-1) 0.454*** 0.111** 0.441*** 0.116** 0.144* 0.0595 0.115 0.0509 
 (0.061) (0.038) (0.061) (0.038) (0.071) (0.045) (0.079) (0.047) 
CL (t-1) 0.437*** 0.693*** 0.454*** 0.720*** 0.350*** 0.318*** 0.317*** 0.290*** 
 (0.064) (0.045) (0.064) (0.046) (0.079) (0.051) (0.086) (0.052) 
Ln GDPpc (t-1) 0.0219* 0.0269** 0.0214+ 0.00954 0.0226 0.0454+ 0.305 0.0970 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.027) (0.024) (0.303) (0.105) 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 786 786 757 757 786 786 757 757 
Num countries 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
R-squared 0.749 0.779   0.822 0.850   
Robust standard error clustered by country in parentheses.  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  Two-period lagged savings rate is used as an instrument for GDP per 




Table 5: Democracy & Income, GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation IV Difference GMM Difference GMM System GMM 
Dependent 
Variable 
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 -0.162 0.0321 0.130 0.149 -0.252 0.120 0.0732 0.0932 
 (3.005) (0.666) (0.252) (0.181) (0.340) (0.247) (0.249) (0.194) 
CL, t-1 -0.861 0.221 0.171 0.0699 0.766+ 0.144 0.925** 0.604* 
 (6.202) (1.376) (0.308) (0.297) (0.442) (0.347) (0.304) (0.292) 
Ln GDP pc, t-1  -2.603 -0.453 -0.233 -0.218 -0.132 -0.166 0.0130 0.0104 
 (14.474) (3.229) (0.191) (0.161) (0.142) (0.105) (0.025) (0.019) 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 655 655 655 655 524 524 524 524 
Num countries 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 
Num instruments   26 26 17 17 24 24 
p-values for...          
AR(2) 0.862 0.643 0.624 0.289     
AR(3)     0.126 0.233 0.346 0.140 
Hansen J-test    0.0845 0.106 0.421 0.338 0.236 0.198 
Diff-in-Hansen (Lagged differences)      0.846 0.920 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 .  Robust two-step standard errors estimated with Windmiejer (2005) small-sample corrections in parentheses.  Year fixed 





Table 6: Democracy & Income, Unbalanced Panel Least Squares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Country Fixed Effects No country FE Country FE 
Estimation OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Dependent variable PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 0.459*** 0.119** 0.437*** 0.116** 0.103 0.0420 0.0896 0.0390 
 (0.057) (0.037) (0.057) (0.036) (0.068) (0.045) (0.072) (0.046) 
CL, t-1 0.433*** 0.681*** 0.470*** 0.713*** 0.393*** 0.332*** 0.369*** 0.310*** 
 (0.059) (0.043) (0.060) (0.044) (0.076) (0.051) (0.080) (0.052) 
Ln GDP pc, t-1  0.0222** 0.0276*** 0.0141 0.00966 0.0181 0.0387 0.191 0.0548 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.029) (0.024) (0.247) (0.110) 
Observations 915 915 866 866 915 915 866 866 
R-squared 0.743 0.771   0.822 0.844   
Num countries 178 178 165 165 178 178 165 165 
Robust standard error clustered by country in parentheses.  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.  Two-period lagged savings rate is used as an instrument for GDP per 




Table 7: Democracy & Income, Unbalanced Panel GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation IV DGMM DGMM SGMM 
Dependent 
Variable 
PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 -1.416 -0.244 0.145 0.0555 -0.446 0.0402 -0.264 -0.0834 
 (21.331) (4.465) (0.228) (0.202) (0.391) (0.309) (0.373) (0.256) 
CL, t-1 -2.869 -0.158 0.422 0.291 1.230** 0.317 1.279** 0.786* 
 (40.416) (8.463) (0.279) (0.323) (0.448) (0.410) (0.426) (0.326) 
Ln GDP pc, t-1  -7.307 -1.474 -0.112 -0.142 -0.0695 -0.171* 0.00933 0.0185 
 (89.924) (18.833) (0.127) (0.127) (0.101) (0.072) (0.020) (0.019) 
Observations 737 737 737 737 575 575 575 575 
Num countries 162 162 162 162 152 152 152 152 
Num instruments   26 26 17 17 24 24 
p-values for...          
AR(2) 0.939 0.824 0.350 0.197   0.937 0.0636 
AR(3)     0.183 0.202 0.279 0.0970 
Hansen J-test 0.00972 0.0243 0.0604 0.0936 0.123 0.0326 
Diff-in-Hansen 
(Lagged diffs) 
      0.938 0.651 
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.   Robust two-step standard errors estimated with Windmiejer (2005) small-sample corrections in parentheses.  Year fixed 





Table 8: Determinants of Democracy, Least Squares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 
Dependent Variable PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 0.116 0.0510 0.123 0.0420 0.129+ 0.0490 0.146* 0.0644 
  (0.077) (0.047) (0.076) (0.057) (0.071) (0.044) (0.071) (0.046) 
CL, t-1 0.319*** 0.290*** 0.370*** 0.333*** 0.360*** 0.323*** 0.346*** 0.317*** 
  (0.084) (0.052) (0.094) (0.063) (0.081) (0.052) (0.079) (0.051) 
Ln GDP pc, t-1 0.315 0.0973       
  (0.334) (0.116)       
Ln Pop, t-1 0.0841 0.00221       
  (0.289) (0.118)       
Ave. Yrs. School, t-1   0.159 0.133     
    (0.223) (0.190)     
Urbanization, t-1     -0.00197 0.00185   
      (0.003) (0.003)   
Oil reserves, t-3       -3.974* -1.970 
        (1.584) (1.475) 
Country Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 757 757 708 708 768 768 786 786 
Num countries 131 131 118 118 128 128 131 131 
R-squared       0.823 0.849 
         Instruments used: Savings rate (t-2), LnPop (t-3) Ave Yrs School Parents (t-3) Urbaniz. (t-3) - - 




Table 9: Determinants of Democracy, SGMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 -0.0604 0.0971 0.195 0.0318 0.0779 0.0891 0.175 0.212 
  (0.298) (0.219) (0.243) (0.156) (0.244) (0.182) (0.312) (0.197) 
CL, t-1 1.014** 0.616* 0.571+ 0.509* 0.791* 0.443 0.747* 0.362 
  (0.347) (0.301) (0.329) (0.259) (0.387) (0.336) (0.364) (0.308) 
Ln GDP pc, t-1 0.0214 0.00948       
  (0.025) (0.019)       
Ln Pop, t-1 0.0179+ -0.00488       
  (0.010) (0.009)       
Ave. Yrs. School, t-1   0.0289 0.0422**     
    (0.026) (0.016)     
Urbanization, t-1     0.00146 0.00266+   
      (0.002) (0.001)   
Oil reserves, t-3       -2.039 -1.592 
        (3.831) (3.579) 
         
Observations 524 524 472 472 512 512 524 524 
Num countries 131 131 118 118 128 128 131 131 
Num instruments 25 25 24 24 24 24 20 20 
Hansen J  (p-value) 0.329 0.189 0.0943 0.195 0.207 0.290 0.415 0.636 
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.928 0.921 0.481 0.514 0.585 0.792 0.297 0.370 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.296 0.146 0.898 0.199 0.357 0.183 0.893 0.852 
Num lags >= 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Instruments for Endogenous Variables Savings rate (t-2), LnPop (t-3) Ave Yrs School Parents (t-3) Urbaniz. (t-3) - - 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.   Robust two-step standard errors estimated with Windmiejer (2005) small-sample corrections in parentheses.  Year fixed effects 




Table 10: Splitting Sample by Muslim Share of Population 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation OLS SGMM 
Subsample: Muslim share < 2.5% < 2.5% >=2.5% >=2.5% < 2.5% < 2.5% >=2.5% >=2.5% 
Dependent variable PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
           
PR, t-1 0.201+ -0.00163 0.0770 0.116 0.521* 0.172 0.0267 -0.139 
  (0.109) (0.057) (0.089) (0.073) (0.230) (0.181) (0.410) (0.229) 
CL, t-1 0.338** 0.367*** 0.397*** 0.282*** 0.445+ 0.690** 0.873+ 0.777** 
  (0.115) (0.068) (0.100) (0.077) (0.260) (0.228) (0.470) (0.263) 
           
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y N N N N 
           
Observations 390 390 396 396 260 260 264 264 
R-squared 0.856 0.869 0.702 0.733     
Num countries 65 65 66 66 65 65 66 66 
Num instruments      23 23 23 23 
Hansen J p-value      0.459 0.109 0.133 0.324 
Diff-in-Hansen p-value      0.147 0.0961 0.486 0.121 
AR(3) p-value      0.203 0.197 0.650 0.284 
Lags >=         3 3 3 3 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.   Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses in columns 1-4.  Robust two-step standard errors estimated with 




[FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION] 
Appendix 
Table A1A: Freedom House Political Rights Categories 
 
FH Political Rights  
Category Sub-Issues 
A. Electoral Process 
1. Is the head of the state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?  
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?  
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling and honest tabulation of ballots?  
B. Political Pluralism and 
Participation 
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of 
their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 
2. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to 
increase its support or gain power through elections? 
3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, 
religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?  
4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, 
autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process.   
C. Functioning of 
Government 
1. Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government? 
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption? 






Table A1B: Freedom House Civil Liberties Categories 
 
FH Civil Liberties Category Sub-Issues 
D. Freedom of Expression 
and Belief 
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?  
2. Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and 
private?  
3. Is there academic freedom and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?  
4. Is there open and free private discussion? 
E. Associational and 
Organizational Rights 
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? 
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective 
bargaining?  
F. Rule of Law 
1. Is there an independent judiciary? 
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control? 
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that 
support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?  
4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?  
G. Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights 
1. Does the state control travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?  
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly 
influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?  
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?  





Table A2: Replicating AJRY results in CL and PWT 6.3 Sample 
 Replicate AJRY Table 2 Col 2 (OLS) Replicate AJRY Table 5 Col 5 (2SLS) 




CL data post-1970 
Subsample with CL post-1970 




CL data post-1970 
Subsample with CL post-
1970 using PWT 6.3 data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PR, t-1 0.379*** 0.333*** 0.342*** 0.363*** 0.336*** 0.309*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0644) (0.0534) (0.0563) (0.0653) (0.0642) 
Ln GDPpc, t-1 0.0104 -0.0314 0.0289 -0.0205 -0.0867 0.177 
 (0.0345) (0.0472) (0.0309) (0.0814) (0.101) (0.259) 
       
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Observations 945 718 890 891 691 849 




Table A3: Robustness Checks for Democracy & Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Estimation 3SLS, No FE 3SLS, FE OLS OLS 2SLS 
Sample Full sample Only countries fully observed 1980-2000 
Dropping observations based 
on DFBeta Dropping savings rate outliers 
Dep. Var. PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 0.441*** 0.113** 0.131** 0.0544 0.0432 0.0515 0.133+ 0.0634 0.147+ 0.0632 
 (0.044) (0.036) (0.047) (0.036) (0.070) (0.055) (0.075) (0.045) (0.077) (0.049) 
CL, t-1 0.455*** 0.688*** 0.341*** 0.295*** 0.418*** 0.273*** 0.424*** 0.365*** 0.277*** 0.285*** 
 (0.054) (0.044) (0.059) (0.046) (0.088) (0.064) (0.079) (0.050) (0.082) (0.054) 
Ln GDPpc,  0.0213+ 0.0129 0.300+ 0.0959 0.0284 0.0424 0.0140 0.0319+ 0.316 0.103 
t-1 (0.013) (0.010) (0.155) (0.112) (0.035) (0.032) (0.023) (0.019) (0.317) (0.108) 
Country FE N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs. 757 757 757 757 742 742 737 739 736 736 
N. Countries 131 131 131 131 150 150 131 131 127 127 
R-squared     0.820 0.843 0.868 0.882   
Robust standard error clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.   Two-period lagged savings rate is used as an instrument for GDP per capita in 





Table A4: Robustness Checks for Democracy Dynamics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Sample 
Drop observations  @ 
lower bound of dep var 
(=0) 
Drop observations  @ 
upper bound of dep var 
(=1) 






Dep. Var. PR CL PR CL Polity IV CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 0.249* -0.00214 0.175* 0.0789   0.218*** 0.0853* 0.398*** 0.0807* 0.0453 0.0766 
 (0.123) (0.040) (0.077) (0.050)   (0.058) (0.038) (0.047) (0.037) (0.089) (0.067) 
CL, t-1 0.342** 0.341*** 0.250** 0.282*** 0.348*** 0.335*** 0.356*** 0.375*** 0.321*** 0.492*** 0.290** 0.132+ 
 (0.114) (0.055) (0.092) (0.061) (0.084) (0.054) (0.079) (0.050) (0.053) (0.040) (0.100) (0.078) 
Polity IV      0.256** 0.0769+       
t-1     (0.087) (0.045)       
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y     
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y     
Obs. 402 546 510 588 684 707 1,114 1,114 1,640 1,640 633 633 
R-squared 0.835 0.822 0.662 0.722 0.845 0.844 0.846 0.872 0.868 0.875 0.827 0.845 




 Table A5: Determinants of Democracy, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent Variables PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 0.145* 0.0602 0.134+ 0.0505 0.129+ 0.0491 0.146* 0.0644 0.116 0.0329 
  (0.071) (0.045) (0.075) (0.048) (0.071) (0.044) (0.071) (0.046) (0.075) (0.045) 
CL, t-1 0.339*** 0.313*** 0.379*** 0.340*** 0.358*** 0.322*** 0.346*** 0.317*** 0.361*** 0.325*** 
  (0.078) (0.051) (0.085) (0.055) (0.081) (0.052) (0.079) (0.051) (0.087) (0.056) 
Ln GDP pc, t-1 0.00760 0.0383+       0.00700 0.0348 
  (0.027) (0.023)       (0.027) (0.023) 
Ln Pop, t-1 -0.148* -0.0704       -0.118 -0.0595 
  (0.061) (0.052)       (0.075) (0.070) 
Ave. Yrs. School, t-1    -0.0218 -0.0102     -0.00388 -0.0178 
     (0.017) (0.015)     (0.042) (0.044) 
Ave. Yrs. School (Female), t-1          -0.0163 -0.000265 
           (0.042) (0.043) 
Urbanization, t-1      -0.000528 0.00199   0.00247 0.00382 
       (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Oil reserves, t-3        -3.974* -1.970 -2.105 -1.046 
         (1.584) (1.475) (1.662) (1.748) 
Country Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 786 786 708 708 768 768 786 786 696 696 
Num countries 131 131 118 118 128 128 131 131 116 116 
R-squared 0.824 0.851 0.820 0.845 0.824 0.853 0.823 0.849 0.826 0.852 




Table A6: Determinants of Democracy, DGMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) (13) (14) 
Dependent Variable PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL 
PR, t-1 -0.401 0.0566 -0.203 0.00427 -0.503 0.00672 0.175 0.212 -0.217 0.0878 
  (0.340) (0.197) (0.331) (0.217) (0.312) (0.229) (0.312) (0.197) (0.332) (0.259) 
CL, t-1 0.829+ 0.0533 0.982* 0.541* 0.922* 0.255 0.747* 0.362 0.836* 0.435 
  (0.435) (0.297) (0.400) (0.265) (0.372) (0.323) (0.364) (0.308) (0.415) (0.350) 
Ln GDP pc, t-1 -0.151 0.0218       -0.191 -0.0729 
  (0.211) (0.137)       (0.168) (0.090) 
Ln Pop, t-1 0.110 0.553*       -0.467 0.120 
  (0.338) (0.236)       (0.348) (0.221) 
Ave. Yrs. School, t-1   0.0137 0.0582     0.00563 0.0141 
    (0.051) (0.044)     (0.209) (0.187) 
Ave. Yrs. School (Female), t-1         0.0374 -0.00383 
          (0.187) (0.134) 
Urbanization, t-1     0.0259 0.0232+   0.00732 -0.00733 
      (0.021) (0.012)   (0.020) (0.012) 
Oil reserves, t-3       -2.039 -1.592 -17.42 -2.020 
        (3.831) (3.579) (20.237) (11.735) 
Observations 524 524 472 472 512 512 524 524 464 464 
Num countries 131 131 118 118 128 128 131 131 116 116 
Num instruments 18 18 17 17 17 17 20 20 22 22 
Hansen J 0.447 0.862 0.207 0.160 0.761 0.636 0.415 0.636 0.379 0.188 
AR(3) 0.0839 0.390 0.570 0.179 0.0635 0.194 0.893 0.852 0.398 0.406 
Num lags >= 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Instruments for Endogenous Variables Savings rate (t-2), LnPop (t-3) 
Ave Yrs School Parents 
(t-3) Urbaniz. (t-3) - All 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.   Robust two-step standard errors estimated with Windmiejer (2005) small-sample corrections in parentheses.  Year 




Table A7: Muslim majority subsample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation OLS DGMM (Lags >= 3 periods) 
Subsample: Muslim share >=50% >=50% >=50% >=50% 
Dependent variable PR CL PR CL 
      
PR, t-1 -0.0165 0.0292 0.0277 0.197 
  (0.115) (0.079) (0.402) (0.216) 
CL, t-1 0.597** 0.386** 0.358 0.0496 
  (0.170) (0.122) (0.622) (0.266) 
      
Country dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y N N 
      
Observations 204 204 136 136 
R-squared 0.604 0.686   
Num countries 34 34 34 34 
Num instruments   16 16 
Hansen J   0.133 0.745 
Diff-in-Hansen   0.278 0.828 
AR(3)   0.380 0.0990 
Lags >=   3 3 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.   Robust standard errors clustered by country in columns 1-2.  Robust two-step standard errors estimated with 
Windmiejer (2005) small-sample corrections in columns 3-4.   
